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Abstract
Over the past decade, Deep Learning has emerged as a
useful and efficient tool to solve a wide variety of complex
learning problems ranging from image classification to hu-
man pose estimation, which is challenging to solve using
statistical machine learning algorithms. However, despite
their superior performance, deep neural networks are sus-
ceptible to adversarial perturbations, which can cause the
network’s prediction to change without making perceptible
changes to the input image, thus creating severe security
issues at the time of deployment of such systems. Recent
works have shown the existence of Universal Adversarial
Perturbations, which, when added to any image in a dataset,
misclassifies it when passed through a target model. Such
perturbations are more practical to deploy since there is
minimal computation done during the actual attack. Sev-
eral techniques have also been proposed to defend the neu-
ral networks against these perturbations. In this paper, we
attempt to provide a detailed discussion on the various data-
driven and data-independent methods for generating uni-
versal perturbations, along with measures to defend against
such perturbations. We also cover the applications of such
universal perturbations in various deep learning tasks.
1. Introduction
Since the introduction of deep neural networks in ef-
fectively solving the ILSVRC [45] image classification
task [26], deep learning has expanded its horizons in solv-
ing a large number of complex tasks. The ability of deep
neural networks to act as good function approximators has
enabled them to successfully solve tasks such as image clas-
sification [48, 19, 23], object detection [43, 42], instance
segmentation [18], language modeling [51, 8], speech gen-
1denotes first authors with an equal contribution, in alphabetical or-
der.
2denotes second authors with an equal contribution, in alphabetical
order.
eration [50, 39], human pose estimation [44, 37], etc. Due
to this widespread use of deep learning techniques, the ef-
ficiency and reliability of these techniques become equally
important when they are deployed in the real world. Many
of these applications are crucial, requiring special focus on
the safety and security of such systems [10].
Recent studies have shown that deep learning models are
susceptible to some carefully constructed small noise called
adversarial perturbations, which when added to an input
image, cause the network output to change drastically with-
out making perceptible changes to the input image [49].
Such perturbations pose a severe threat to the real-world
application of any neural network model, especially in sce-
narios of autonomous vehicles and facial verification sys-
tems. Studies have shown that if an attacker has access
to the model which needs to be attacked (i.e., the target
model) along with access to only a few images from the dis-
tribution of images using which the target model has been
trained, then they might achieve very high fooling rates (see
Sec. 2.1) on the entire distribution of images in the target
dataset [49, 16, 32].
Several techniques have been proposed to generate ad-
versarial examples. While some of these approaches [16,
27] focus on maximizing the loss function of the target
model by changing the input in the opposite direction of
its gradients, i.e., by using gradient ascent, others [49, 6]
modify the input using a surrogate objective function that
causes the target model to misclassify the modified image.
For all of these techniques, the perturbations generated are
different for different images, i.e., a separate optimization
has to be performed for each image to generate an adversari-
ally perturbed image. This kind of generation of adversarial
perturbations is hence called per-instance generation.
While per-instance adversarial perturbation varies for
different samples in a dataset, there exist image-agnostic
perturbations (see Sec. 2.1) called universal adversarial
perturbations (UAPs) as introduced by Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. [31] that can fool state-of-the-art (SOTA) recogni-
tion models on most natural images with high probability
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Figure 1: When the same perturbation (center) is added to
clean images on the left, it causes misclassification of im-
ages generated on the right [31]. Note that the change on
the clean images (left) after adding the perturbation are im-
perceptible.
and are quasi-imperceptible, i.e., not visible to the naked
eye (see Fig. 1). Since we need to compute only a sin-
gle perturbation vector to fool all the images, they are
much more efficient in terms of computation time and cost
when compared to per-instance adversarial attacks. Gen-
erally, the `p norm of the perturbation is kept small to
make it quasi-imperceptible. Furthermore, UAPs gener-
alize well across different architectures, exhibiting excel-
lent transferability and fooling rates on models other than
the target model. Since [31], many methods have been
introduced by researchers to generate UAPs, both data-
driven and data-independent (see Sec. 2.1). [17] introduced
a method to generate UAPs using Universal Adversarial
Networks (UANs), leveraging Generative Adversarial Net-
works (GANs). [34][33] introduced a data-independent ap-
proach to generate UAPs by adulterating the features ex-
Figure 2: The above timeline shows the year of publica-
tion of various attack and defense methods mentioned in
this survey. These methods include UAP [31], UAP with
GM [17], NAG [41], SPM [25], FFF [34], PRN [2], GD-
UAP [33], AAA [40], UAT [46], SAT [35], and UAP via
PD-UA [29]. (A) denotes an attacking method and (D) de-
notes a defense method.
tracted at multiple different layers of the network. Their ap-
proach of crafting perturbations did not utilize any knowl-
edge about the data distribution using which the target
model has been trained. [41] introduced a data-driven ap-
proach utilizing fooling and diversity loss along with a gen-
erative model to create UAPs. [40] extended [41] by in-
troducing a two-stage process to create adversaries using
class impressions without using any data. Several other
works [12, 28, 25, 29] have also introduced methods to cre-
ate adversarial attacks.
UAPs being image-agnostic can misclassify any unseen
image, making deep neural networks vulnerable to attacks.
Defense mechanisms are hence required to prevent such at-
tacks. [2] introduced the Perturbation Rectifying Network
(PRN) to defend against UAPs. [46] proposed a method
to increase the robustness of a model against UAPs by
training with perturbed images using min-max optimiza-
tion. [35] extended the previous approach [46] by introduc-
ing a shared training procedure for defense against univer-
sal adversarial perturbation. [7] analyzed the robustness of
neural network models against UAPs with varying degrees
of shape and texture-based training.
Even though most of the above work were related to im-
age classification, usage of UAPs extends to both classifica-
2
tion and regression tasks. [33] showed the usage of UAPs in
object recognition, image segmentation, and depth estima-
tion. [28] proposed a universal adversarial attack against im-
age retrieval. [12] also showed the existence of a universal
(token-agnostic) perturbation vector that causes text to be
misclassified with high probability. [1, 36] showed the exis-
tence of UAPs for audio classification and speech recogni-
tion systems.
This paper aims to (i) summarize the recent advances
related to universal adversarial perturbations including the
various attack and defense techniques, (ii) compare and an-
alyze various methods proposed for generating UAPs, and
(iii) cover the various tasks where the applicability of UAPs
has been exhibited.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows - in Sec. 2,
we specify and define all the notations and terminologies
used in the subsequent sections. In Sec. 3, we briefly state
the reasons for the existence of universal perturbations. In
Sec. 4, we try to cover all the different techniques of gener-
ating universal adversarial perturbations and provide a de-
tailed comparison of these techniques. In Sec. 5, we cover
the defense techniques that are effective against the attacks
introduced in Sec. 4. Extension of universal perturbations
to various tasks has been summarised in Sec. 6. Sec. 7 sum-
marizes the future directions in context to UAPs. Finally,
we provide a conclusion of our survey in Sec. 8.
2. Taxonomy
In this section, terms and notations related to universal
adversarial perturbations used throughout the paper are in-
troduced.
2.1. Terminology
Following is a list of terms along with their definitions:
• image-agnostic perturbation or universal adversarial
perturbation: Such a perturbation δ which can be
added to any image x to make a neural network f mis-
classify the perturbed image (x+ δ).
• data-driven techniques: Such techniques which utilize
and require some images, x ∈ X , for generating ad-
versarial perturbations.
• data-independent techniques: Such techniques which
do not consume any image, x ∈ X , for generating
adversarial perturbations.
• target model: Deep neural network under adversarial
attack.
• white box attacks: Attacks in which the attacker has
access to the underlying training policy of the target
network model.
• black box attacks: Attacks in which the parameters and
underlying architecture of the target network model is
unknown to the attacker.
• non-targeted adversarial attack: The goal of a non-
targeted attack is to slightly modify the source image
in a way so that it is classified incorrectly by the target
model, without special preference towards any partic-
ular output.
• targeted adversarial attack: The goal of a targeted at-
tack is to slightly modify the source image in a way
so that it is classified incorrectly into a specified target
class by the target model.
• saturation rate: The proportion of pixels p out of to-
tal pixels in the perturbation δ which achieve the max-
norm constraint (`∞) at the current iteration t (used in
[33]).
• fooling rate: The proportion of total perturbed images
(x+ δ) in a dataset for which f(x) 6= f(x+ δ) where
f is the target model.
2.2. Notations
These are the mathematical notations that are followed
throughout the paper. We will stick to these notations unless
it is explicitly specified.
• x: Clean input to the target model, typically either a
data sample or class impression [40].
• X: Distribution of images in Rd using which the tar-
get model under attack has been trained, i.e., the target
distribution.
• Xd: Actual data points xi ∈ X available to the attacker
in case of data-driven techniques (see Sec. 2.1).
• m: Total number of data points in Xd.
• f : Target model under attack, which is a trained model
with frozen parameters.
• K: Total number of layers in the target network f .
• f(x): Model prediction for a given data sample x.
• f i: ith layer of the target network f .
• f ik: kth activation in ith layer of the target model.
• fps/m: Output of the pre-softmax layer.
• fs/m: Output of the softmax (probability) layer.
• δ: Additive universal adversarial perturbation (UAP).
• ∆: Distribution of perturbations δ in Rd.
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• Xδ: Dataset obtained by adding the perturbation δ to
all the data points in Xd.
• ξ: Max-norm (`p) constraint on the UAPs, i.e., maxi-
mum allowed strength of perturbation.
• St: Saturation rate (see Sec. 2.1) at the end of tth iter-
ation.
• Ft: Fooling rate (see Sec. 2.1) at the end of tth itera-
tion.
• H: The patience time interval of validation for ver-
ifying the convergence of the proposed optimization
(used in [33]).
3. Explaining the Existence of Universal Per-
turbations
Before diving into the various techniques of generat-
ing universal adversarial perturbations, it is essential to un-
derstand the reason behind the existence of such image-
agnostic perturbations, which can be used to fool a target
model f on all the images in the target data distribution X .
For a target model f to misclassify a sample data point
x ∈ Rd, it would be enough to add such a perturbation δ ∈
Rd to the point x so that it just crosses the decision boundary
nearest to it. To get the smallest possible δ, the vector ~δ
should be perpendicular to the nearest decision boundary.
However, in the case of a universal adversarial perturbation,
we want only one such δ to be able to fool f for all the data
points available in X . This means that our objective while
generating a universal perturbation is to find such a δ, which
upon adding to all the data points x in X , makes them cross
the decision boundary nearest to them (see Fig. 3).
At first, it might sound a challenging task to generate
such a perturbation δ, which simultaneously fools all the
images in X . However, by exploiting the geometric corre-
lations between the different parts of the decision bound-
ary of the target model, it has been shown that generating
such perturbations is possible. One of the main reasons for
the existence of universal perturbations is the existence of a
low dimension subspace which captures this correlation be-
tween different parts of the decision boundary of the target
model f [31].
4. Attacks
Universal adversarial perturbations as introduced in [31],
are such image-agnostic perturbations δ which when added
to an image x ∈ X , cause misclassification of the perturbed
image (x + δ) when given as input to a target network f .
Essentially, the main objective of a universal perturbation
δ ∈ Rd is to fool the target neural network model f on
almost all the input images belonging to the distribution X .
∆v 1
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Figure 3: In this illustration, data points x1, x2 and x3
are super-imposed, and the classification regions Ri (i.e.,
regions of constant estimated label) are shown in different
colors. One of the possible ways to get a universal perturba-
tion [31] proceeds by aggregating sequentially the minimal
perturbations sending the current perturbed points xi + δ
outside of the corresponding classification regionR.
That is,
f(x+ δ) 6= f(x), for almost all x ∈ X (1)
In the following sub-sections, we will be covering some
of the data-driven and data-independent techniques of gen-
erating universal adversarial perturbations.
4.1. Data-Driven Techniques
As explained in Sec. 2.1, data-driven techniques require
some images x ∈ X for the generation of universal pertur-
bations. The actual number of images required for the gen-
eration of perturbations depends on the applied approach.
While some techniques [25, 17] require only a small frac-
tion of images from the target distribution X , others [31]
require a relatively large fraction of images from the target
distribution X .
4.1.1 Universal Adversarial Perturbations [31]
Along with satisfying Eqn. 1, the perturbations generated
by this method should also follow the max-norm constraint,
i.e., the strength of the perturbations δ should not be greater
than ξ so that the perturbations remain imperceptible to hu-
man eyes. Also, the perturbations should achieve at least
a fixed amount of fooling rate on the available data points
Xd, which can be specified in terms of the desired accu-
racy (α) on perturbed samples (Xδ). These equations can
be summarised as
‖δ‖p ≤ ξ (2)
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P
x∼Xd
(f(x+ δ) 6= f(x)) ≥ 1− α. (3)
Algorithm 1 Iterative Deep Fool Algorithm [31]
1: input: Data points Xd ∈ X , target model f , desired
`p norm of the perturbation ξ, desired accuracy on per-
turbed samples α.
2: output: UAP δ.
3: Initialize δ ← 0d.
4: while Err(Xδ) ≤ 1− α do
5: for each datapoint xi ∈ Xd do
6: if f(xi + δ) = f(xi) then
7: Compute the minimal perturbation that
sends xi + δ to the decision boundary:
∆δi ← arg min
r
‖r‖2 s.t. f(xi + δ + r) 6= f(xi).
8: Update the perturbation:
δ ← Pp,ξ(δ + ∆δi).
9: end if
10: end for
11: end while
To achieve the above constraints, the proposed Algo. 1
initializes δ with 0d and for each data point xi available in
Xd, a smallest change ∆δi is found which upon adding to
δ makes the target model f misclassify the perturbed data
point (xi + δ + ∆δi). The added perturbation (δ + ∆δi) is
then projected on an `p ball of radius ξ using the operation
Pp,ξ(δ + ∆δi) to get the updated δ. This is done to satisfy
the max-norm constraint given by Eqn. 2.
To ensure constraint given by Eqn. 3, all the points in the
available data set Xd are iterated as above until the total er-
ror Err(Xδ) achieves the desired value as specified in terms
of α. Err(Xδ) is calculated as
Err(Xδ) :=
1
m
m∑
i=1
1f(xi+δ) 6=f(xi) ≥ 1− α (4)
The proposed algorithm given by Algo. 1, finds one
of the many possible δ satisfying Eqn. 2 and Eqn. 3 and
not necessarily the optimal one. Perturbations δ generated
by using the proposed algorithm Algo. 1 are illustrated in
Fig. 3 for various target models. We can identify some vi-
sual patterns in all of these perturbations. The perturbations
for shallower networks such as VGG-16 and VGG-19 [47]
have coarse patterns, while the perturbations for deeper net-
works such as GoogLeNet [48] and ResNet-152 [19] have
much finer patterns.
4.1.2 Learning Universal Adversarial Perturbation
with Generative Models [17]
In this attack, a generative model, namely the Universal Ad-
versarial Network (UAN, denoted by µ), is used to craft the
universal perturbations. µ is trained similarly as the gen-
erator network in a GAN [15], and hence, after training µ
learns a whole distribution of perturbations rather than just
a single perturbation as in [31].
An overview of the attack is illustrated in Fig. 4.
A random vector z sampled from a normal distribution
N (0, 1)100 is given as input to µ, which outputs a pertur-
bation δ as output. This delta is then scaled by a factor
ω ∈ (0, ξ||δ||p ] where ξ is the maximum allowed strength of
the perturbation and p = (2 or ∞), to obtain a scaled per-
turbation δ
′
. The adversarial image created by adding δ
′
to
an image x ∈ Xd is clipped and finally fed into the target
model f .
The parameters of the UAN are then optimized using the
following loss function
Lnt = max{log [f(δ′ + x)]c0 −max
i6=c0
log [f(δ
′
+ x)]i − k}
+α · ||δ′ ||p
(5)
for a non-targeted attack where c0 is the class label pre-
dicted by f , and
Lt = max{max
i6=c
log [f(δ
′
+ x)]i − log [f(δ′ + x)]c − k}
+α · ||δ′ ||p
(6)
for a targeted attack where c is the target class. It is im-
portant to note that the parameters of the target model are
frozen and not optimized during the attack.
Algorithm 2 Learning Universal Adversarial Perturbations
with Generative Models [17]
1: input: Data points Xd ∈ X , target model f , desired `p
norm of the perturbation ξ.
2: output: Trained UAN model µ that has learned a dis-
tribution of UAPs ∆.
3: while max-iteration or convergence do
4: Sample a vector z from N (0, 1)100.
5: δ ← µ(z).
6: δ
′ ← ω · δ.
7: get an image x from Xd
8: if arg maxi f(x+ δ) = arg maxi f(x) then
9: For non-targeted attack, optimize Eqn. 5
10: For targeted attack, optimize Eqn. 6
11: end if
12: end while
Depending on the type of attack, Eqn. 5 or Eqn. 6 is op-
timized. The optimization is stopped once the required ad-
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Figure 3: Universal perturbations generated using
Algo. 1 [31] for different target models.
versarial perturbation is found, and the confidence threshold
condition is satisfied, which is given by Eqn. 7.
k > max
i6=c0
log[f(δ
′
+ x)]i − log[f(δ′ + x)]c0 (7)
Where k is a hyperparameter. The complete approach
can be summarized by Algo. 2. The main advantage of
this approach over [31] is that it allows the UAN to learn a
whole distribution of universal perturbations rather than just
a single perturbation. This distribution is especially useful
(i) to provide an insight into the working and susceptibil-
ity of the target model, (ii) accordingly prevent black-box
attacks, (iii) ease transferability of the generated perturba-
tions across networks and increase diversity between them,
as well as, (iv) facilitate adversarial training (see Sec. 5).
4.1.3 NAG : Network for Adversary Generation [41]
Similar to the previous approach [17], this approach also
uses a generative model to learn a whole distribution ∆
of UAPs. The authors have proposed novel loss functions
to make sure that the generated perturbation δ successfully
fools the target model, but also that these generated pertur-
bations, are different from one another so that all the pertur-
bations do not converge to the same perturbation.
The proposed attack is summarised in Fig. 5. After
generation of a perturbation batch {δ}B , three different
batches of images are formed from it to pass to the target
model; namely, the adversarial batch comprising of per-
turbed images{x + δ}B , benign batch comprising of origi-
nal images {x}B and the shuffled adversarial batch which
is a shuffled version of {x + δ}B . These batches are then
passed to the target model, and the parameters of the gener-
ator model (G) are optimized using the following loss func-
tions,
1. Fooling loss: This loss tries to minimize the confidence
of a clean label on the perturbed sample by optimizing
the following Eqn. 8 given by
Lf = −log(1− fs/mc0 ) (8)
where c0 is the class predicted by the target model for
the benign batch, and fs/mc0 is the softmax value cor-
responding to c0 when the adversarial batch is passed
through f .
2. Diversity loss: This loss ensures the diversity among
generated perturbations by incorporating the pair-wise
distance between the generated embeddings.
Ld = −
B∑
n=1
d(f i(xn + δn), f
i(xn + δ
′
n)) (9)
where d(·, ·) is the distance between a pair of features,
x + δn is the nth perturbed image in the adversarial
batch and xn + δ
′
n is the n
th perturbed image in the
shuffled adversarial batch.
100 z
Scale Clip
Target 
Model
Figure 4: Overview of the model used in [17]. A random sample from a normal distribution is fed into a UAN [17]. This
outputs a perturbation , which is then scaled and added to an image. The new image is then clipped and and fed into the target
model.
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The total loss function is a sum of the above two losses,
Total Loss = Lf + Ld (10)
Algorithm 3 Network for Adversary Generation [41]
1: input: Data points Xd ∈ X , target model f
2: output: Generator G that has learned ∆
3: while max iterations or convergence do
4: Sample a vector z
5: Transform z using G to get {δ}B =
(δ1, δ2, δ3, ..., δB)
6: Generate three quasi-batches:
• Benign BatchXB = {x}B = (x1, x2, x3, ..., xB)
• Adversarial Batch XA = (x1 + δ1, x2 + δ2, x3 +
δ3, ..., xB + δB)
• Shuffled Adversarial Batch XS = (x1 + δ1′, x2 +
δ2
′, x3 + δ3′, ..., xB + δB ′) where δk 6= δ′k
7: Feed each batch through f to compute loss
8: Update parameters of G
9: end while
4.1.4 Stochastic Power Method [25]
To achieve the objective given by Eqn. 1, this approach pro-
poses to maximize the difference between the activations of
a particular layer for clean image x and perturbed image
x+ δ. Mathematically,
‖f i(x+ δ)− f i(x)‖q → max, ‖δ‖p = ξ (11)
for a small value vector δ we have,
f i(x+ δ)− f i(x) ≈ J i(x)δ
where
J i(x) =
∂f i
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x
is the Jacobian matrix of f i. For the q norm we can write,
‖f i(x+ δ)− f i(x)‖q ≈ ‖J i(x)δ‖q (12)
To maximize the value on the L.H.S. of Eqn. 12, we need to
maximize the R.H.S. of Eqn. 12. Thus, the final optimiza-
tion problem is reduced to
‖J i(x)δ‖q → max, ‖δ‖p = ξ (13)
and for the given set of data points Xd, Eqn. 13 is modified
to ∑
xj∈Xd
‖J i(xj)δ‖q → max, ‖δ‖p = ξ (14)
Eqn. 14 can be solved by using the Power Method [5].
Let Xd = {x1, x2 . . . xm} be the subset of the training set
Parameters are updated
Shuffle
Loss
Parameters are not updated
=+
+
Adversarial batch
Benign batch
Shuffled
adversarial batch
+
Figure 5: Overview of the approach proposed in NAG [41] to model the distribution of generated perturbations for a given
target model (Best viewed in colour).
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chosen to create the perturbations and m be the total number
of samples. We compute J i(xj) ∈ Rm×n for each xj ∈ Xd
and stack these matrices in the following manner:
J i(Xd) =

J i(x1)
J i(x2)
. . .
J i(xm)
 (15)
We then compute matvec functions of J i(Xd) and
(J i(Xd))
T and run the Power Method for computing the
desired δ. Algo. 4 summarizes the proposed approach (re-
fer to the actual paper for the detailed algorithm).
Algorithm 4 Stochastic Power Method for generating
UAPs [25]
1: input: A batch of images Xd = {x1, x2, . . . xm},
f i(x) - fixed hidden layer of the target model
2: output: UAP δ
3: for xj ∈ Xd do
4: Compute the Jacobian of J i(xj) and (J i(xj))T
5: end for
6: Construct the matvec functions of J i(Xd) and
(J i(Xd))
T defined in Eqn. 15.
7: Run Power Method [5] with desired p and q.
8: return δ
4.2. Data-Independent Techniques
As explained in Sec. 2, data-independent techniques re-
quire no data for the generation of universal adversarial per-
turbations. No data requirement makes these techniques
more applicable in the real world, where the distribution of
the target dataset is usually not available to the attacker.
4.2.1 Fast Feature Fool [34]
The paper, for the first time, raises a reasonable concern
for training data availability and thus proposes a novel data-
independent approach to generate image-agnostic perturba-
tions for a range of CNNs trained for object recognition, and
shows its triple universality: (i) universality across multi-
ple images from the target dataset over a given CNN, (ii)
transferability across multiple networks trained on target
dataset, and (iii) the surprising ability to fool CNNs trained
on datasets different than the target dataset.
Due to the unavailability of data, the training objective
has to be different from the simple flipping of network out-
put (as used in prior data-driven approaches), so they for-
mulated an optimization problem to compute the perturba-
tion δ which misfires the features at individual layers of a
CNN to impartially raise activations, eventually leading to
the misclassification of the sample, thus fooling the CNN
with high probability.
Loss function used for the computation of δ is given by,
Loss = − log
(
K∏
i=1
f¯ i(δ)
)
s.t. || δ ||∞ < ξ (16)
where, f¯ i(δ) is the mean activation at layer i when the per-
turbation δ is input to the CNN, and K is the total number
of layers in the CNN at which we maximize activations for
the perturbation δ.
The proposed objective computes the product of mean
activations at multiple layers in order, and, intuitively, the
product is a more definite constraint to force activations
at all layers to increase simultaneously for the loss to re-
duce. Also, to avoid working with extreme values (≈ 0),
the logarithm of the product is used as the loss function.
It is also worth noting that activations are considered af-
ter the non-linearity (typically ReLU). Therefore f¯ i is non-
negative, and it is empirically suggested to restrict optimiza-
tion at convolution layers. Finally, convergence is under-
stood when either the loss gets saturated or the fooling per-
formance over a small held outset is maximized. The com-
plete algorithm is summarized in Algo. 5.
Algorithm 5 UAP generation via FFF [34]
1: input: Target model f , desired `∞ norm of the pertur-
bation ξ
2: output: UAP δ
3: Initialize δ randomly.
4: while convergence do
5: Optimize δ to achieve higher f¯ i(δ) as in Eqn. 16.
6: Clip δ to satisfy imperceptibility constraint ξ
7: end while
8: return δ
4.2.2 GD-UAP [33]
This approach is an extension of the previous data-
independent approach [34] for generating universal adver-
sarial perturbations. Instead of optimizing the loss given
by Eqn. 16, the proposed method tries to generate pertur-
bations δ that can produce maximal spurious activations at
each layer of the target model f using the following loss
function,
Loss = − log
(
K∏
i=1
‖f i(δ)‖2
)
s.t. ‖ δ ‖∞ < ξ (17)
Observe that the proposed loss function in Eqn. 17 uses
the `2 norm of activations of the intermediate layers instead
of mean activations as used in [34]. The authors have also
shown the effectiveness of their approach when additional
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(a) CaffeNet (b) VGG-16
(c) VGG-19 (d) GoogLeNet
Figure 6: Universal perturbations generated using Fast Fea-
ture Fool algorithm [31] for different target models.
priors available about the target data, such as, (i) mean (µd)
and standard deviation (σd) of the target data Xd, or (ii) the
actual data points in Xd.
Algorithm 6 GD-UAP [33] using different/no priors
1: input: Target model f , data g. Note that g = 0 for
data-independent case, g = d ∼ N (µd, σd) for range
prior case, and g = Xd for training data samples case.
2: output: Image-agnostic adversarial perturbation δ
3: Randomly initialize δ0 ∼ U [−ξ, ξ]
4: t = 0
5: Ft = 0
6: while Ft < min. of {Ft−H , Ft−H+1 . . . Ft−1} do
7: t← t+ 1
8: Compute f i(g + δ)
9: Compute loss = −∑ log( K∏
i=1
‖f i(g + δ)‖2
)
10: Update δt through backprop.
11: Compute the rate of saturation St in the δt
12: if St < θ then
13: δt ← δt/2
14: end if
15: Compute Ft of δt on substitute dataset D
16: end while
17: j ← arg max {Ft−H , Ft−H+1 . . . Ft}
18: return δj
Instead of scaling the generated perturbation δ at reg-
ular intervals as proposed in [34], the authors have pro-
Class Impression Generation
Gz
Perturbation Generation
TC
TC
Stage-I
Stage-II
Class Impressions
Learned UAPs
Figure 7: Overview of the proposed approach in [40].
Stage-I, ‘Ask and Acquire’, generates the class impressions
to mimic the effect of actual data samples. Stage-II, ‘At-
tack’, learns a neural network based generative model G
which crafts UAPs from random vectors z sampled from a
latent space.
posed adaptive rescaling of δ based on its saturation rate
(see Sec. 2.1). Rescaling of δ by half is done only when the
saturation rate St (see Sec. 2) is less than some constant θ.
The main advantage of this approach is that the authors
have shown the effectiveness of their method in fooling neu-
ral networks over a wide variety of tasks such as object de-
tection, semantic segmentation and depth estimation (see
Sec. 6). The complete algorithm is summarized in Algo. 6.
4.2.3 Ask, Acquire and Attack: Data-free UAP Gener-
ation using Class Impressions [40]
The data-driven approaches create UAPs by utilising the un-
derlying data distribution and optimizing the fooling objec-
tive, thereby achieving successful fooling rates. However,
data-independent approaches have access to only the pa-
rameters and architecture of the target network model, lead-
ing to lower fooling rates. ‘Ask, Acquire and Attack’ [40]
is a two-stage process to craft UAPs, and tries to exploit
the benefits of both data-driven and data-independent tech-
niques (see Fig. 7).
In the first stage, ‘Ask and Acquire,’ the proposed
methodology tries to imitate the real data samples by cre-
ating class impressions that are reconstructed from the tar-
get model’s memory or trained parameters. The generation
of impressions begin with a random noisy image sampled
from a uniform distribution U [0, 255] and updating it till it
changes the predicted label category with high confidence.
For this purpose maximization of the predicted confidence
is done in Eqn. 18. Refer Sec. 2 for notations used. Differ-
ent random initialization results in different class impres-
sions.
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(a) Goldfish (b) Lakeland terrier
(c) Cock (d) Wolf spider
Figure 8: Sample class impressions generated during the
‘Ask and Acquire’ stage of [40] for the VGG-F target
model.
CIc = arg max
x
fps/mc (x) (18)
For the second stage, ‘Attack’ a generator network G is
trained using the class impressions crafted in the previous
stage, leveraging them as training data (see Fig. 7). G is
trained similar to the generator of a GAN [15]. The loss
functions used in this approach are inspired by [41]. The
main focus of the generator network is to generate pertur-
bations δ which misclassify x on addition. For this pur-
pose, we try to minimize the confidence of a clean label on
a perturbed sample by optimizing the fooling loss given by
Eqn. 19.
Lf = − log(1− fs/mc (x+ δ)) (19)
To ensure diversity among generated perturbations sim-
ilar to [41], the pair-wise distance between the two embed-
dings f(x + δi) and f(x + δj) in a mini-batch is incorpo-
rated. Thus, a diversity loss given by Eqn. 20 is also pro-
posed.
Ld = −
K∑
i,j=1,i6=j
d(f(x+ δi), f(x+ δj)) (20)
Therefore total loss needed to be optimized is given by
Eqn. 21.
Loss = Lf + λ · Ld (21)
The proposed algorithm, as given by Algo. 7, trains the
generator model G to create universal adversarial perturba-
tions.
Algorithm 7 Ask, Acquire and Attack: Data-free UAP
Generation using Class Impressions [40]
1: input: Target model f , generator network G, latent
space z, random distribution µ, parameters learning rate
λ, max-perturbation constraint ξ.
2: output: Distribution of UAPs ∆ learned by G.
3: Create class impressions data Xc for each class in the
target model using Eqn. 18.
4: while max iteration or convergence do
5: for each datapoint x in Xc do
6: δ ← G(z)
7: x
′ ← x+ δ
8: Calculate loss as mentioned in Eqn. 21.
9: Update G through backprop.
10: end for
11: end while
4.2.4 UAP Generation via PD-UA [29]
Figure 9: UAP generation technique proposed by [29]. Note
the texture bias image at the bottom left.
The proposed methodology claims that the fooling of a
target model is attributed to the predictive uncertainty of the
model outputs. Epistemic uncertainty is associated with the
parameters of a model that has been trained on a specific
dataset (e.g., ImageNet [45]). In contrast, the aleatoric un-
certainty is a data-independent task-dependent uncertainty
which stays stable for various input data but differs for var-
ious tasks.
Proposed technique is summarised in Fig. 9. To approx-
imate the epistemic uncertainy, the authors have proposed
the use of Monte Carlo (MC) dropout [11] for the approx-
imation of virtual epistemic uncertainty [29] using the fol-
lowing loss function for capturing the same,
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Ue(δ) =
K∑
i
∑
k
pe(∆ik) (22)
pe(∆ik) =
1
T
T∑
t
[− log(‖f ij(δ)‖2 · ztk)], s.t. ‖δ‖p < ξ
(23)
where ∆ik is the kth neuron in the ith layer of the target
model f , ztk means the neuron ∆ik is dropped out through
the tth feedforward network, T is the total number of feed-
forward networks for MC dropout.
Algorithm 8 UAP Generation via PD-UA [29]
1: input: Target model f , parameters learning rate λ,
dropout probability p
2: output: Image-agnostic adversarial perturbation δ
3: Initialize δ with texture image.
4: while max iteration or convergence do
5: Compute f i(δ) at ith convolution layer.
6: Approximate zj = 0 via MC dropout.
7: Compute loss function as in Eqn. 25.
8: Update δ through backprop.
9: end while
10: return δj
A texture bias is introduced to take care of the aleatoric
uncertainty, which helps maximize the activation of neu-
rons in the target model f . The Maximum Activation Loss,
as given in Fig. 9, which encourages the reproduction of
texture details is given as,
La = E[Gij(δ)−Gij(δ0)], Gij(δ) =
∑
k
Flik(δ)Fljk(δ)
(24)
where G is the Gram matrix of the features extracted
from certain layers of the target model f , Flik is the acti-
vation of the ith filter at position k in the layer l, and δ0
is the texture style image that is fixed during training, as
shown in Fig. 9. The combined loss function can be written
as,
Loss = Ue(δ) + ρ× La (25)
where ρ is a tradeoff factor between the two losses. Fur-
thermore, the authors have used a Laplacian Pyramid Fre-
quency Model to increase the low-frequency part of the per-
turbation during the update step of the optimization. The
overall proposed technique is given in Algo. 8. A detailed
specification of the approach can be found in the paper [29].
(a) UAP [31] (b) UAP with GM [17]
(c) NAG [41] (d) SPM [25]
(e) FFF [34] (f) GD-UAP [33]
(g) AAA [40] (h) UAP via PD-UA [29]
Figure 10: Universal adversarial perturbations generated by
different techniques to fool the VGG-19 target model. Im-
ages are best viewed in color.
4.3. Comparison amongst Attacks
In this sub-section, we summarize the strengths and
weaknesses of the techniques covered in the previous sub-
sections and compare them based on various parameters.
Since their introduction in [31], the techniques to pro-
duce UAPs have seen an improvement both in terms of an
increase in fooling rates, and a decrease in the number of
samples in Xd (Xd = φ in case of data-independent tech-
niques) required for generating the UAP.
The fooling rates in the case of data-independent tech-
niques [40, 29] are relatively low as compared to their data-
driven counterparts [41, 25], which can be explained from
the fact that the data-independent techniques do not have
any prior knowledge about the distribution of the target data.
The amount of data using which the perturbations are
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Table 1: Summary of the attributes of different attacking methods. The ‘Perturbation Norm’ indicates the restricted `p-norm
of the perturbations that the authors of the respective methods use to show their results. The fooling rates are mentioned from
the respective papers with VGG-19 [47] as the target model.
Method Data-Driven/Independent Targeted/Non-Targeted Perturbation Norm Fooling Rate
UAP [31] Data-Driven Non-Targeted `2, `∞ 77.8%
UAP with GM [17] Data-Driven Non-Targeted/Targeted `2, `∞ 84.6%
NAG [41] Data-Driven Non-Targeted `∞ 83.8%
SPM [25] Data-Driven Non-Targeted `∞ 60.0%
FFF [34] Data-Independent Non-Targeted `∞ 43.6%
GD-UAP [33] Data-Independent Non-Targeted `∞ 40.9%
Ask, Acquire, Attack [40] Data-Independent Non-Targeted `1 72.8%
UAP via PD-UA [29] Data-Independent Non-Targeted `∞ 48.9%
optimized is an important factor in determining the time of
convergence of an algorithm, as all the techniques involve
iterating over all the available data points in Xd. While
[31] requires a large amount of data in Xd for perturba-
tion generation, [25] has shown that by using only 64 im-
ages in Xd fooling rates as high as 60% can be achieved.
Since data-independent techniques do not consume any data
points from the distribution X , these techniques converge
much quicker than their data-driven counterparts but at the
cost of lower fooling rates.
Some of the techniques produce only a single universal
adversarial perturbation as in [31, 29], while others pro-
duce a whole distribution of universal adversarial perturba-
tions [41, 17]. Although a single universal adversarial per-
turbation is sufficiently capable of fooling a target model,
learning a whole distribution of perturbations helps us to
understand and analyze the behavior of these perturbations,
and hence propose better defense techniques against them.
Although the term universal in universal adversarial per-
turbation stands for the universality of the perturbation
within the same data distribution X using which the tar-
get model has been trained (i.e., the same perturbation can
be used for all images in X to fool the target network
model), the perturbations produced by almost all the tech-
niques introduced in the previous sections show excellent
transferability in fooling neural networks other than the tar-
get model [34, 31, 41]. Additionally, it has also been shown
that the same perturbation generated for a target model can
be used to misclassify images from a data distribution thats
different from the target data distribution. The decrease in
the fooling rate on images not in the target data distribu-
tion is significant in the case of data-driven techniques as
compared to data-independent techniques [34].
5. Defenses
Deep neural networks being vulnerable to adversarial at-
tacks, pose a serious threat to real-world applications such
as autonomous cars, biometric identification, and surveil-
lance systems, with security being a critical factor. The
vulnerability of target models towards these adversarial at-
tacks reflects the inability of the models to learn the fun-
damental visual concepts. The cross-model transferability
of UAPs [31, 40] empowers attackers to generate univer-
sal perturbations rather than per-instance perturbations and
also facilitates black-box attacks. Therefore, to create ro-
bust models and alleviate adversarial attacks, various de-
fense methods were proposed, as discussed in this section.
To counter adversarial attacks, two ways of defenses
are generally considered: one is to preprocess the image
through various image processing algorithms at the infer-
ence time, and the other is by making the model more robust
through adversarial training.
5.1. Perturbation Rectifying Network [2]
This paper [2] introduces a new network, namely, the
Perturbation Rectifying Network (PRN), which can be used
as a separate network to preprocess the input image before
passing it to the target model. The primary purpose of the
PRN is to restore the perturbed image to the original image,
i.e., to subtract the perturbation from the perturbed image.
So in case a perturbation is present (checked via a binary
classifier called the Detector Network), a rectified image is
passed to the classifier network, else the original image is
passed to the classifier network which classifies the input
image. The whole process is described in Fig. 11.
To train the PRN, a large amount of diverse UAPs are
required to perturb clean images. However, it is very time-
consuming to generate perturbations using [31]. So, the
authors propose an algorithm to generate synthetic pertur-
bations using a given set of universal adversarial perturba-
tions.
The PRN is trained to optimize the following loss func-
tion using the set of synthetic perturbations,
Loss =
1
N
N∑
i=1
L (li, l
∗
i ) (26)
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Figure 11: The process proposed in PRN [2]. During the training of PRN, the loss is calculated between the label predicted
by passing the clean image and the rectified image through the target model. Also, note that the weights of the target model
are frozen during training.
Algorithm 9 Method to compute correct confidence
vector from a set of perturbed/non-perturbed images [2]
1: input: Target model f , trained PRN on target model,
image dataset of perturbed/non-perturbed images (Xδ)
2: output: Correct softmax (probability) fs/m of
perturbed/non-perturbed images
3: while iterate over images in Xδ do
4: Pass image(I) through PRN and store the output as
R.
5: Subtract I from R and pass the result to f(.).
6: Pass the output of f(.) to binary classifier B.
7: if B(f(R− I)) == 0 (perturbation absent) then
8: fs/m ← f(I)
9: else if B(f(R − I)) == 1 (perturbation present)
then
10: fs/m ← f(R)
11: end if
12: end while
whereL (·, ·) is a loss function, li and l∗i are the labels pre-
dicted by the target model for a clean image and for the
perturbed image obtained after passing through PRN.
Also, note that the parameters of the target model which
we wish to defend are frozen during the entire process.
Hence, this method is compatible with defending a variety
of neural network models against UAPs, and does not re-
quire the fine-tuning of the parameters of the target model.
The test time process is described in Algo. 9.
5.2. Universal Adversarial Training [46]
The paper first proposes an efficient and straightforward
optimization-based universal attack that can be generated
using stochastic gradient descent methods, learning pertur-
bations 13 times faster than the standard method [31]. Then,
to defend against these attacks, it proposes two methods
of universal adversarial training. The first one models the
training process as a two-player min-max game where the
minimization is over the target model parameters, and the
maximization is over the universal adversarial perturbation.
The second method further improves the defense efficiency
by providing a ‘low-cost’ algorithm with a slight decrease
in robustness, but reducing the training time by half as com-
pared to the previous one.
Different from Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [32], this paper
proposed a stochastic gradient-based optimization for a β-
clipped loss function,
max
δ
L (w, δ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
lˆ(w, xi + δ), s.t. ‖δ‖p ≤ ξ (27)
lˆ(w, xi + δ) = min{l(w, xi + δ), β} (28)
where l(w, ·) represents the loss used for training DNNs,
w represents the target model weights, X = {xi; i =
1, . . . , N} represents training samples, δ represents univer-
sal perturbation, and β is hyperparameter used to clip the
unbounded cross-entropy loss.
The above optimization problem can be solved by a
stochastic gradient method, where each iteration is based
on a minibatch of samples instead of one instance. This
accelerates computation on a GPU, and requires a simple
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Figure 12: This figure represents the process flow as mentioned in Algo. 11. Perturbations created through the previous step
are used to train a robust model. The combined process of universal adversarial perturbation generation and training is called
Shared Adversarial Training.
gradient update instead of the complex DeepFool [32] inner
loop, resulting in fast convergence of the proposed method.
Universal adversarial training formulates the problem
of training robust classifiers as a min-max optimization
problem.
min
w
max
‖δ‖p≤
(w, δ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
l(w, xi + δ) (29)
Previously, solving this optimization problem directly
was deemed computationally infeasible due to the substan-
tial cost associated with generating a universal adversarial
perturbation [38], but the authors show that unlike Madry et
al. [30], updating the universal adversarial perturbation us-
ing a simple step is sufficient for building universally robust
networks.
Algorithm 10 Alternating stochastic gradient method for
adversarial training against universal perturbation [46]
1: input: Training samples X , perturbation bound ,
learning rate τ , momentum µ
2: for epoch = 1 . . . Nep do
3: for minibatch B ⊂ X do
4: Update w with momentum stochastic gradient
descent;
5: gw ← µgw − x∈B [∇w l(w, x+ δ)]
6: w ← w + τgw
7: Update δ with stochastic gradient ascent;
8: δ ← δ +  sign(x∈B [∇δ l(w, x+ δ)])
9: Project δ to `p ball.
10: end for
11: end for
As in Algo. 10, each iteration alternatively updates the
target model weightsw using gradient descent, and then up-
dates the universal adversarial perturbation δ using gradient
ascent, only once per step, and these updates accumulate for
both w and δ through training.
Low-cost Universal adversarial training: As UAPs are
image-agnostic, so the results of the updating target model
parameters and updating perturbation δ should be invariant
to their order of change in one iteration. Thus the proposed
methodology calls for the simultaneous update for target
model parameters and the universal adversarial perturbation
in Algo. 10, which backpropagates only once per iteration
and produces approximately universally robust models at
almost no cost in comparison to natural training.
5.3. Defending against Universal Perturbations
with Shared Adversarial Training [35]
This paper introduces the idea of ‘shared adversarial
training to increase the perceptibility of universal adversar-
ial perturbations generated through an adversarially trained
model, and handle the tradeoff between enhanced robust-
ness against UAPs vs. reduced performance on clean data
samples in a better fashion than prior work.
The authors define three relevant risks:
1. Expected Risk: Expected loss of the model for the
given data distribution,
ρexp(θ) = E(x,y)∼D L(θ, x, y) (30)
2. Adversarial Risk: Expected adversarial loss dependent
on specific samples,
ρadv(θ,S) = E(x,y)∼D
[
sup
ξ(x)∈S
L(θ, x+ ξ(x), y)
]
(31)
3. Universal Adversarial Risk: Expected Adversarial
Loss generalised over the entire data distribution,
ρuni(θ,S) = sup
ξ∈S
E(x,y)∼D [L(θ, x+ ξ, y)] (32)
And relate them as,
ρexp(θ) ≤ ρuni(θ,S) ≤ ρadv(θ,S), ∀θ ∀S ⊃ {0} (33)
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Here the set S defines the space from which perturba-
tions may be chosen. The objective of adversarial training
is to minimise σ · ρadv(θ,S) + (1 − σ) · ρexp(θ). For this
work, an adversary has been defined as a function that maps
data points and a set of model parameters to find a strong
perturbation that maximizes the fooling rate. A special kind
of adversary called heap adversary is further introduced to
compute perturbations against each of the heaps generated,
as shown in Fig. 12. For further clarification regarding risks,
refer [35]. The proposed algorithm given by Algo. 11 finds
δ through shared adversarial training.
Algorithm 11 Method to generate shared adversarial per-
turbations [35]
1: input: Data points d, sharedness s
2: output: δ to be used for adversarial training
3: Initialize delta.
4: for d/s iterations do
5: Generate gradient ∇ by passing through target
model
6: ∇← sgn(∇) ∗ αk
7: Broadcast ∇ to size s
8: δ← δ + generated shared perturbation∇
9: clip δ to [−ξ, ξ]
10: end for
11: Add shared perturbations δ to d/s heaps for adversarial
training.
12: Iterate till convergence.
13: return δ
The benefits of shared adversarial training in this pa-
per are proved to be extended to image segmentation tasks,
apart from the usual image classification tasks. From the ex-
periments, it is also noted that this technique leads to mod-
els that are particularly robust against universal adversarial
perturbations.
6. Extension of UAPs to Other Tasks
In all of the previous sections, the focus was mainly
on the techniques which generate UAPs to fool the target
model trained for classification tasks. In this section, we
cover all the various tasks where UAPs can be effectively
used.
6.1. Semantic Segmentation
Semantic segmentation is the task of assigning a class
to every pixel in the image. Various applications rely on
semantic segmentation, whether it is route navigation for
autonomous cars, robot vision, or portrait mode of a smart-
phone. Before diving into how adversarial attacks for se-
mantic segmentation are generated, it is important to ex-
emplify the fooling in semantic segmentation. There exist
adversarial perturbations that cause the model to output the
same segmentation map for different arbitrary inputs. The
attacker could also target removing a specific class, leaving
the rest of the segmentation map unchanged [20]. As seen
in Fig. 13, adding the perturbation hides a specific class
(pedestrian in this case) from the target segmentation map.
This type of attack poses a severe threat to the real-world
application of semantic segmentation in autonomous cars,
robotics, or other computer vision-related tasks. Adversar-
ial attacks for segmentation tasks are quite similar to the
classification task. While the fooling rate for an image clas-
sification task is well defined, it is unclear for other tasks
like segmentation. Therefore a task-independent ‘General-
ized Fooling Rate (GFR)’ is introduced here,
GFR(M) =
R−M(yˆδ, yˆ)
R
(34)
Here M is the metric for measuring the performance of
a model for any given task, yˆ is the clean image output, yˆδ
is the perturbed image output, and R is the range of M .
Defining the fooling rate in such a manner helps in ef-
fectively measuring the changes caused by the adversaries
in the model’s output. It also assists the attacker in deter-
mining the performance of the perturbation in terms of the
damage caused to a model with respect to a metric.
Semantic segmentation models are trained to perform
pixel-level classification into n categories, including the
background. Performance is generally measured through
mean Intersection over Union (IoU) computed between the
predicted and ground truth segmentation map. Extension of
UAPs [31] directly for this task is non-trivial. [33] showed
that their algorithm for the generation of UAPs could be
directly applied for this task without any changes. The au-
thors reported their results on the PASCAL-VOC 2012 [9]
dataset. Since this dataset had the background pixels per-
centage greater than half, the authors created a smaller
training dataset with a lower background pixels percent-
age and named it as ’data with less BG’. The perturba-
tion created with this data has a higher capability of fool-
ing or an increased Generalized Fooling Rate for mean IoU
(GFR(mIoU)).
As seen in Fig. 14, perturbations learned for the task of
semantic segmentation for different models look different
across architectures, similar to object recognition. For the
same input image, perturbations learned by different models
produce very different outputs even when their clean image
output looks similar, as can be noted from Fig. 15.
Metzen et al. [21] proposed a novel approach to generate
UAPs specifically for semantic segmentation. They intro-
duced two methods, one to make the target model output a
fixed segmentation map, and the other to remove one class
from the target model output. They further show that on
passing the generated UAPs (in case of a fixed target seg-
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Figure 13: Illustration of the effect of adding perturbation in generating a target segmentation map to hide pedestrians.
mentation map) through the target model, the output looks
similar to the target scene itself.
[35] proposed shared adversarial training for training ro-
bust models against universal adversarial perturbations for
the semantic segmentation task. Their method showed a
considerable increase in robustness for both targeted and
non-targeted attacks for a little tradeoff in accuracy.
6.2. Depth Estimation
Most of the attacks discussed until now mainly focused
on creating UAPs for classification tasks. Various recent
works such as [14, 3, 24] showed an increase in the use
of convolutional networks for computer-based regression
tasks. Depth estimation is the task of obtaining a depth map
of an RGB image. For monocular-depth estimation, it can
also be framed as a pixel-level continuous regression prob-
lem. Algorithms to calculate the depth map do not rely on
hand-crafted features and instead use deep neural networks.
Adversarial attacks on these models may cause the network
to regress the depth per pixel erroneously. Targeted attacks
on these networks result in the depth of a specific class to
be inaccurate (see Fig. 16). [33] provided an algorithm for
crafting UAPs for CNNs performing regression. Similar to
semantic segmentation, the fooling rate for depth estimation
is reported through Generalized Fooling Rate (seeEqn. 34).
The authors showed that the fooling performance of the per-
turbation also varies with the metric used for analysis, hence
reported fooling through GFR(δ), GFR(Abs.Rel.Err.)
and GFR(RMSE).
Universal adversarial perturbations generally target non-
FCN-Alex FCN-8s-VGG DL-VGG DL-RN101
Figure 14: UAPs crafted by GD-UAP (see Algo. 6) for
semantic segmentation with initial prior as ’data with less
BG.’
FCN
Alex
FCN-8S
VGG
DL
RN101
DL
VGG
Figure 15: Semantic segmentation output with initial prior
as ’data with less BG’ for different models. The first row
shows perturbed images, the second row shows segmenta-
tion output for clean images, and the third row shows seg-
mentation output for perturbed images.
robust features of an image for fooling. [22] conjectured
that ”the attacks are made possible not by perturbing salient
pixels containing important depth cues, but by mostly per-
turbing non-salient pixels.”. Based on this conjecture,
they introduced a training regime for creating a robust
model, proposing to mask out the non-salient pixels using a
saliency map∗ since they are the most vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks.
6.3. Image Retrieval
Image retrieval is a well-established research topic in
computer vision [52], which aims to find relevant images
from a dataset given a query image. Li et al. [28] was the
first to propose a universal adversarial attack against image
retrieval systems (see Fig. 17). Concretely, image retrieval
attacks are to make the retrieval system return irrelevant im-
ages to the query at the top of the ranking list. Extensive ef-
∗Saliency Map: a set of a small number of pixels from which a CNN
can estimate depth accurately.
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Figure 16: The first row shows clean and perturbed images with various priors, and the second row shows the corresponding
predicted depth maps from the KITTI [13] dataset generated for monodepth-VGG.
Feature shift RetrievalAttacking
Figure 17: The UAP when added to multiple images cause
most of the images to shift in the feature space without pre-
serving original neighborhood relationships. The top is the
perturbation and dots represent the features of images [28]
(Best viewed in color).
forts have been made to improve search accuracy, but very
little work has been done around the vulnerability of state-
of-the-art image retrieval systems. Although retrieval sys-
tems use CNNs as the feature extractor, it is still challenging
to apply existing UAPs generation techniques in image re-
trieval directly because of several reasons, namely (i) differ-
ent dataset label formats, (ii) different goals, (iii) different
sizes of model input, and (iv) different model output and
optimization methods, as explained in [28].
A novel universal adversarial perturbation attack method
for image retrieval is proposed in [28], tackling the above
challenges. A neural network generates a UAP, which,
when used to slightly alter the query along with randomized
resizing of images and UAPs, breaks the neighborhood rela-
tionships among image feature points, causing degradation
in the corresponding ranking metric. Image retrieval can be
viewed as a ranking problem, from which perspective the
relationship between query and references plays an impor-
tant role. Thus, these relationships are utilized to improve
attack performance further. Such attacks showed its efficacy
against the real-world visual search engines like Google Im-
ages, revealing threats to such image-retrieval systems.
6.4. Text Classification
Before talking about perturbations in text classification,
we first need to define what fooling a text classification sys-
tem means. A perturbation in the text classification sys-
tem means replacing or adding a few words with their syn-
onymous words (see Table. 2). [12, 4] describes a token-
agnostic perturbation, which when applied to each token of
the text (sentence), can misclassify the text.
Text (top: original, bottom: adversarial) Prediction
i walk and dana runs . 1
i walk , dana runs . 0
Table 2: Adversarial sample generated on CoLA evaluation
data whose annotations are labeled according to grammati-
cal correctness of sentences.
[12] describes a method to add a UAP to the embedding
vector of the tokens of the sentence. These perturbations are
generated so that the actual meaning of the sentence does
not change. A norm in the n-dimensional embedding space
is defined for this purpose, and then a method similar to [31]
is used to generate the perturbation. There are possibilities
of such attacks in NLP systems such as language translation
and sentiment classification too.
7. Future Directions
The performance of universal adversarial perturbations
has increased not only in terms of increased fooling rates
and lesser or no data requirement but also in terms of con-
vergence time required to craft such perturbations. Ex-
ploration and creation of such UAPs using different novel
methods not only lay the path for better defense mecha-
nisms but also helps us to have a better understanding of
the behavior of the decision boundary of target models. [7]
has shown that models produced by shape-biased training
(trained on object shapes) are as vulnerable to UAPs as
those by texture-biased (trained on image textures) ones.
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However, those produced by both training biases are better
in performance than other model architectures. The same
paper shows that untargeted UAPs are more likely to tilt the
decision of the classifier towards specific class labels.
While the extensions covered in Sec. 6 show the appli-
cability and effectiveness of universal adversarial perturba-
tions in a wide variety of tasks, actual applicability of UAPs
to fool modern AI systems is still far-fetched. This is mainly
because the fooling rates achieved with UAPs are still very
less than those achieved by per-instance perturbation gen-
eration methods [32, 6]. Nevertheless, due to the minimum
computation required during deployment (only the addition
of UAP to the input image), UAPs are more practical for
attacking any system in realtime. Hence, an increase in the
fooling rates of UAPs to levels comparable to those of per-
instance perturbations would further increase their applica-
bility in the real world. This would, therefore, make way
for better defense mechanisms for attacks against deep neu-
ral networks.
8. Conclusion
This paper presented the first comprehensive survey in
the direction of universal adversarial perturbations in deep
learning. Deep neural networks are found to be vulnerable
to adversarial attacks regardless of their high performance
and accuracy. Since [31], many papers have introduced var-
ious data-driven and data-independent algorithms to gener-
ate universal adversarial perturbations. While being quasi-
imperceptible, these perturbations are transferable across
multiple networks. Data-independent approaches enable at-
tackers to fabricate white-box attacks and can pose a severe
threat to security-critical applications when applied in the
real world. In this paper, we surveyed various pre-eminent
attacks and defense techniques for both non-targeted and
targeted attacks and discussed the reason for their existence.
We also discussed the application of these UAPs for var-
ious tasks such as object recognition, semantic segmenta-
tion, depth estimation, image retrieval, and text classifica-
tion.
After the review, we conclude that the universal adver-
sarial perturbations pose a significant risk to the application
of deep neural networks in the physical world. The cur-
rent performance of defense techniques for creating robust
models is competent, but there is no elixir as such. How-
ever, owing to the active research in this field, it is hoped
that various attacks and defense techniques to create robust
models through deep learning will show up in the future.
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